trained (TWAIL) eye provide an elevated platform from which to gaze into the horizon, and to make out, in outline, a picture of what seems to lie in store for most African peoples in the future of international law.
The three main questions that are dealt with in this article all relate to the extent to which future international law can reasonably be expected to promote much more effectively the well-being of African peoples. The first such question is the extent to which future international law can be reasonably expected to curtail its significant role in the generation and Three of the concepts that feature prominently in the questions articulated above require some explanation, or at least a measure of location. These concepts are: poverty, agency and resistance. Let me begin by explaining briefly what I mean by the term poverty. While one of the World Bank's key short hands for measuring poverty-living on less than one dollar a day-is now widely accepted and used as a key measure of that condition around the world, 3 as I use the term poverty in this article it is meant to include any incidence of the fundamental deprivation, or the serious lack, of basic needs (such as food, water, shelter, education, clothing and essential medicines).
This understanding of poverty does not of course conflict with the World
Bank's overall approach to poverty reduction. 4 Yet, without enacting what
Baxi has called 'a hierarchy of pain and suffering', the understanding of poverty that is suggested here largely avoids the under-inclusion of significant forms of grinding poverty that may not be captured by the day 'dollar-a-day' measure. It also eschews the over-inclusion of some whose suffering pales in comparison with the kind of suffering that is intended to be addressed by the term 'poverty'. 5 As used in this article, the term agency 'refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their capability of doing those things in the first place'. 6 In articulating this understanding of agency, I am obviously indebted to Anthony Giddens' much-referenced work on 'structuration'. 7 Thus, as Seckinelgin has correctly noted, the concept of agency is fruitfully understood as the capability to deal with an issue, question or problem. 8 For both Richard Falk and Balakrishnan Rajagopal, it is to a combination of state action and social movement protests (not one or the other) that one must turn to understand the meaning of resistance in the international legal order. 9 It is this approach that has shaped my understanding and use of the term here as encompassing both resistance by African states and social movement action within and across state boundaries. That approach has also shaped my conception of the nature of the targets to which such resistance ought to be directed (in appropriate cases) as inclusive, not just of powerful states but also of certain non-state global actors like the key international financial institutions (IFIs) and many transnational corporations (TNCs). My treatment of resistance in this article has also been heavily influenced by Upendra Baxi's seminal work on social movements and human rights, especially the distinctions he draws between 'good' and 'bad' social movements. 10 The focus in this article on poverty, agency and resistance is justified by the salience and significance of all three concepts in the historical struggles of most African peoples for human dignity. First, it is now almost trite to say that the reduction of poverty on the African continent is key to the success of their overall struggle for dignity. 11 Yet it bears emphasis here to note that even today '40% of all Africans survive on less than a dollar a day' and far more than that number eke out a living in an atmosphere of grinding material deprivation. 12 The What is left unsaid by the EU is that, at least for now, this approach to African agency is manifested more at the level of rhetoric and desire, and less at the level of practice. The much-discussed history of the implementation of structural adjustment strategies and other such policies in Africa bears eloquent testimony to the veracity of this claim. 17 Third, given the prevalence of imposed governance policies in Africa, it is hardly controversial to claim that the capacity of African peoples to resist these impositions and rewrite the relevant global rules will in itself be a highly important factor in the success or failure of each of their struggles for dignity. 18 The rest of the article is divided into four parts. The first three sections will deal with the questions articulated in the foregoing paragraphs, while the last, concluding, section will provide an overall assessment of future international law's likely posture(s) with regard to the need to radically reduce poverty in most African societies, to recognise and promote local agency in almost all these places, and to permit and more meaningfully internalise African resistance to non-favourable global rules.
On poverty
Any credible consideration of the likely extent of future international law's commitment to the significant reduction of poverty on the African continent must begin from a serious analysis of the existing evidence in this regard. It must therefore proceed from the recognition of the historical reluctance of the international legal order to promote actively the socioeconomic wellbeing of most Africans. As the late Ivan Head once noted:
That international law can, indeed should, contribute to development, is not in question, but it must be remembered that some of the applications of legal principles, designed as they often were in the industrialised countries, are not always in the interest of developing countries. Thus only the first sub-question will be examined.
That sub-question will be considered by engaging in a relatively general discussion of the question of the possible elimination of the trade-distorting agricultural subsidies that many of the far richer countries of the North have for decades maintained in the global trading system, while ensuring that most
African countries effectively open up most of their own markets to imports from these far richer countries. 20 This is an issue that is governed by the World Trade Organization's (WTO) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 21 Given the fact that a sizeable majority of African people live in rural areas and depend for their subsistence on agriculture,very large number of African countries are as reliant for their national incomes on the export of their agricultural produce to markets in the geopolitical North, 23 any factor that negatively affects the volume and prices of these exports to the North poses a highly significant obstacle to the struggle to substantially increase the incomes of African peoples and to thereby reduce the incidence of poverty on the African continent. As such, the relative failure, at least to date, of international (trade) law to deal effectively with these tradedistorting agricultural subsidies has made an important negative contribution to the continuing poverty of far too many Africans. 24 The extent of this agricultural subsidy has been estimated at $300 billion (a massive figure that basically equals the total economic output from all of Africa). 25 Yet these subsidies have survived in large measure despite the fact that almost all of the farms in the North that benefit from such subsidies are really marginal to the economic output and prosperity of the relevant countries (largely the EU, the USA and Japan). 26 By contrast, as has been argued above, agriculture remains central to the economic survival of most African peoples. As discussed, there is little in reality that suggests that the more powerful states will in the near or medium-term future be willing to make the kinds of fundamental economic concessions to African states in areas such as the elimination of agricultural subsidies without extracting from these African countries certain countervailing concessions (which will tend to detract from the gains of the anticipated cuts in these Northern subsidies). History teaches us that the more economically powerful states, indeed almost all states, hardly ever give up their more powerful positions in a willing fashion. As such, barring any sudden seismic shifts in the configuration of global power, or in the receptiveness of the public and/or ruling elites in the more powerful states of the North to more far-reaching pro-global equity ideas, these more powerful states are likely to continue to act in ways that essentially preserve rather than reform the economic status quo. This is not to say that these states will not make any concessions whatsoever to African states. They will certainly make many such concessions over the near and medium-term future of international law. What one is much less sanguine about is the preparedness and ability of any of these states of the North to make the kind of radical concessions that would fundamentally threaten the privileged socioeconomic positions of almost all of their citizenry vis-a`-vis the vast majority of African peoples.
On agency
To what extent is future international law likely to permit or promote the exercise of more African agency in the governance of African societies, while restricting to a minimum the current overbearing role of outsiders in the constitution of these societies? If, as Giddens has shown, the term agency is best understood as the capability of doing things, this question can also be framed in terms of the extent to which future international law is likely to permit or promote the capability of African peoples to chart their own futures and to self-constitute. 28 Here again, a credible inquiry into this question must begin with an attempt to understand the historical tendencies of international law in this connection.
Are there historical continuities that meet the eye in this respect? And what kinds of discontinuities, if any, can be observed? As Antony Anghie's work has shown, despite the discontinuities that exist in the exact forms and techniques that were deployed, there is indeed a historical continuity from at least the 16th century onward in international law's tolerance of, if not active support for, the negation and/or erasure of Third World (including of course African) agency. 29 At root this denial of African agency has taken the form, in each era of global interrelations, of an assault on the capacity of African peoples to govern their own lives and chart their own futures. In the mid-19th
to the mid-20th century, this negation of African agency was more formal, extensive and suffocating than it currently is.
European colonial rule over Africa, in which nearly every aspect of the life of almost every African society became marked to some extent by a coercively (and often brutally) superimposed colonial order. 31 Quite obviously, that specific era of formal colonial rule over Africa has now ended.
However, it is instructive that up to this day the term imposition (or its synonyms) remains the key word when discerning African leaders and scholars describe the African continent's relationship to international institutions or to the North. For example, as Nigerian President Olusegun
Obasanjo, a key African leader, has recently noted:
when we [Africans] thought we had regained control of our destiny, and when we believed that we had earned our rights to join the rest of the world as equal partners and discuss mutual co-operation on basis of equitability, we discovered that the position of our continent in the world order had been disadvantageously fixed and predetermined by numerous factors which, for want of a better description, we call colonial legacies. In terms of predicting the orientation of future international law in this respect, at a minimum there is as yet insufficient cause for near or mediumterm optimism. As BS Chimni has shown, if much care is not taken, the ongoing, less formal, less extensive and less suffocating processes via which international law and institutions (usually dominated by the more powerful countries of the North) impose upon, or at least exert strong compliance pressure on, African and other Third World states, risks being transformed into a more formal, more extensive, and more suffocating global regime that is akin in many important respects to the systems of colonial rule that severely constricted African agency in the 19th and 20th centuries. 37 As he has put it:
A network of economic, social and political IIs [international institutions] has been established or repositioned, at the initiative of the first world, and together they constitute a nascent global state whose function is to realize the interests of transnational capital and powerful states in the international system to the disadvantage of third world states and peoples. The evolving global state formation may therefore be described as having an imperial character. 38 In my own view this assessment of the direction in which the international legal order is moving and is likely to continue to move receives much support from the example of the way in which the framework economic governance of
African peoples and of the vast majority of the other Third World countries
has been all but seized by certain IFIs, institutions that are clearly and extensively dominated by a small number of the most powerful countries of the North. As I argued not too long ago, it is now clear to most critical observers that the framework governance of African societies has now been effectively relocated to IFIs and certain key countries of the North. 39 It has, in other words, been externalised. 40 As economically weak as almost all of them are, African countries which want and need to maintain their creditworthiness-a minimum requirement for participation in the international economy-must come to terms with a largely predetermined set of policies imposed upon them by a loose but cohesive consortium made up of the IMF, World Bank and key G8 countries (and their banks). 41 In almost all cases, these African countries are required to remove social subsidies, privatise key industries and retrench significant proportions of their public employees. 42 Regardless of one's view about the reasonableness or otherwise of these policies, the point that is being made here is that, despite the usual declarations about these policies being 'home grown', they have in almost every case been imposed by this IMF-led consortium. and tenets that are favoured by the IFIs. As James Gathii has correctly noted, NEPAD adopts the same kinds of market-based development strategies that are highly recommended by the IMF to African countries. 44 Except for the fact that NEPAD makes a little more provision for the accommodation of some of the anticipated 'losers' in the implementation of the IMF-style economic reforms it endorses, the NEPAD document could easily have been written in an early to mid-1990s, or even in a contemporary, IMF Bank's own policy prescriptions for Nigeria. 49 Similarly, while noting some of the difficulties associated with its implementation, the IMF has still described the current government's overall economic reform programme as 'commendable'. 50 It also described the retrenchment of 17 000 workers resulting from the implementation of this same economic 'restructuring' agenda as 'progress'. 51 All these comments point to the IMF's overall satisfaction with Nigeria's implementation of the same kind of broad economic reform agenda that it has routinely insisted the country adopt. There is little reason, if any, to believe that the answers to these questions will be positive in the near or medium-term future. There is also little reason to suppose that the countries of the North that currently dominate our global order will willingly concede to Africans the level of agency that they desire.
Indeed, it would seem that Africans will be lucky to retain even the low levels of agency that they are now allowed under the current international legal order. Thus, unless a critical mass of African societies is able to acquire substantially more global socioeconomic and political power and/or to become better able to resist those aspects of our current and future global circumstance which tend to disadvantage African peoples, the African continent of the future will, under the watchful eyes of international law, remain in its historically subordinated global position.
On resistance
If the resistance of African societies to certain aspects of the international legal order will be central to Africa's escape in the near and medium-term future from the clutches of gross poverty and disadvantage, then the extent to which that future order is likely to be transformed by such resistance matters much. So do the forms that such resistance must take if it is to be effective. As noted in the introduction to this article, the concept of resistance that is deployed here draws on the separate writings of Richard Falk and Balakrishnan Rajagopal. As such, the extant discussion focuses not merely on the dissent expressed by African leaders with respect to the nature of the international legal order, but also on the resistance mounted by African peoples, especially as manifested in the efforts of those social movements that engage in pro-African struggles on the international plane.
An assessment of the extent to which future international law is likely to allow the necessary room for African resistance to its more pernicious aspects can be either more or less optimistic. For instance, at the less optimistic end of the spectrum Joel Ngugi has argued that international law is so problematic for the struggle of African and other Third World peoples that it cannot be reformed from the inside. 52 To Ngugi the entire episteme that grounds international law is so heavily biased in favour of a Eurocentric world-view that it ought to be abandoned by African and other Third World peoples. 53 In his view third world peoples ought to 'build an alternative oppositional template from which to address the problem of domination in international law'. 54 However World peoples. Having said that, the point being made in this section is that, in order to experience significantly greater success, 'good' Third World international law reform or transformation projects will, it seems, need to work both transnationally and in a social movement mode. The fact that 'bad' social movements can also deploy this strategy should not on its own deter these 'good' movements from adopting this otherwise ethical strategy that significantly increases their chances of success.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is useful to provide an overall assessment of the vision of the broad position that most African peoples are likely to occupy in the international legal order of the near and medium-term future presented in this article. This less than clairvoyant reading of that future order's likely overall posture is mediated by the prism of that order's existing historical record with regard to its stance on the radical reduction of poverty in Africa, on the markedly increased promotion of local agency on the continent, and on the African resistance to some of its dictates.
Seen through these prisms, international law is unlikely to undergo any really far-reaching or fundamental transformation. It is unlikely to be transformed in the near or medium-term future into a normative order that serves African people much more effectively. Future international law is unlikely to be altered so as to as foster the kind of much more equitable for Africa and our entire global circumstance to experience speedy and sustainable change. Thus, absent that near or medium-term possibility, and barring any sudden deep structural changes in current ideational, economic, political and social power asymmetries in the global order, change will continue to be administered on Africa (and not really by Africans). And such change will continue to drip onto the continent in rather small (but hopefully incremental) doses.
